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Abstract
This paper tests the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise was
caused by the threat of revolution, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson [Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 115, 1167-1199, 2000]. We approximate the threat of revo-
lution in a given country by revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries.
We investigate the relationship between this new measure of the threat of revolution
and measures of su¤rage reform in two samples of European countries covering the
period from 1820 to 1938. We nd strong support for the threat of revolution the-
ory. We also nd some evidence that war triggered su¤rage reform, whereas other
theories of the extension of the franchise, including modernization theory, receive
little support.
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1 Introduction
Why would the political elite of a country ever want to extend the voting franchise to
broader segments of the population? After all, by doing so, it dilutes its own political
base and exposes itself to the risk of redistribution. One answer to the challenge posed by
this question is that the governing classes extend the franchise to avoid revolution or other
forms of radical social transformation.1 To be sure, there are many other ways to head o¤
a revolution, but, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) point out in their seminal work
on this question, voting rights have the advantage that once they are granted, they are
hard to take back.2 Accordingly, a franchise extension can serve as a commitment to future
redistribution in cases where it would not be credible for the elite to redistribute while
retaining power. Along similar lines, Conley and Temini (2001) argue that the extension of
franchise occurs when the interests of the enfranchised and disenfranchised groups conict
and the disenfranchised group presents a credible threat. Boix (2003) also views the threat
of revolution as a process that strengthens the hand of the disenfranchised, but emphasizes
the interaction with structural and organizational parameters that makes democracy cheap
relative to autocracy rather than the commitment value of democracy.
The threat of revolution plays a central role in these arguments. The historical record
provides justication for this focus. For example, the work by Tilly (1995) suggests that
contentious gatherings in Great Britain gained momentum in the period leading up to
the critical vote on the Great Reform Act in the autumn of 1831 and when Lord Grey
introduced the reform bill in Parliament earlier that year with the words the principal
of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution[...] I am reforming to preserve, not
to overthrowhe was making a clear reference to the perceived risk of violent and radical
social change. Political historians, such as Lee (1994), suggest that the threat of violence
also played a key role in relation to the Second Reform Act in 1867. The perceived link
between franchise extension and the threat of revolution is by no means unique to Britain.
1See Tullock (1971) for a classical exposition of why revolutions happen.
2For alternative theories of franchise extension, see Justman and Gradstein (1999), Lizzeri and Persico
(2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005), Falkinger (1999) or Congleton (2004, 2007, 2011). Jack and Laguno¤
(2006) formulate a general theory of dynamic enfranchisement that encompasses many of these competing
theories.
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For example, Tilton (1974) grants the threat of revolution a central role in the Swedish
franchise reforms of 1866 and 1909, and, of course, the revolution of 1848 was a direct
cause of subsequent franchise reform in France, as was the (unsuccessful) 1905 revolution
in Russia.
It is, however, more di¢ cult to establish if the threat of revolution played a decisive
role more generally when other potential causes of franchise reform are taken into account
and yet more challenging to establish if any observed correlation between the threat of
revolution and su¤rage reform represents a causal e¤ect or is just coincidental. A small
literature has made some attempt at addressing these challenges. Kim (2007) argues that
strike activity within a country can be used as a proxy for the threat of revolution and
shows that various measures of strikes are correlated with franchise reforms in a sample of
12 western European countries between 1880 and World War II. Przeworski (2009) studies
a broader sample of countries but his focus is on the period after the Great War. He uses
data on demonstrations, riots, and strikes to proxy the threat and establishes a strong
correlation between these measures and the probability of su¤rage reform.
In this paper, we propose a new measure of the threat of revolution. According to the
threat of revolution theorythe political elites contemplating franchise reform needed to
assess the likelihood of revolution in their country. To this end, they would obviously use
information about the situation locally, e.g. about riots, strikes or other types of social
unrest. But they would also observe what was happening elsewhere and use reports about
revolutionary activities in neighboring countries to update their assessment of the likeli-
hood of revolution at home. Based on this, they would then decide whether to relinquish
power and to extend voting rights as a preemptive measure. Our proposed measure of
the threat of revolution is based on this logic of international transmission of information.
Based on the work by Tilly (1993) and others, we have recorded all revolutionary events
in Europe during the period 1820 and 1938 and used this to construct new measures of
the threat of revolution as it might have been perceived by the governing elites in di¤er-
ent countries in the region at the time. The underlying logic suggests that the governing
elites would learn more from revolutionary events closer to homeand we construct threat
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measures based on geographical and linguistic distance to the event.
Our approach has two major advantages that sets it apart from previous tests of the
threat of revolution theory. The rst advantage is that our measure can, under two plau-
sible conditions, be used to access the causal link, if any, between the threat of revolution
and su¤rage reform. First, the governing elites in each country revised their assessment of
the risk of a home-grown revolution upwards after observing revolutionary events in neigh-
boring countries. As we discuss in section 3, there exists convincing historical evidence
that the elites did in fact pay attention to revolutionary events as and when they happened
abroad and that these played a pivotal role in decisions to extend the franchise. Second,
by focusing on revolutionary events in the neighborhoodof a country and by excluding
events that happened within a country itself, these events represent exogenous shocks to
the information set of the elite. Our measure of the threat level is therefore unlikely to be
correlated with other (observed and unobserved) determinants of su¤rage reform such as
political rivalry between factions within the national elites or general enlightenment trends
originating within that country. In contrast, threat measures based on national events
in particular labor market unrest and riots are likely to be endogenous to the political
situation of the country in which they take place. In fact, one may conjecture that reform
politics and local riots and strikes might be driven by the same largely unobserved political
and economic factors. Accordingly, while Kim (2007) and Przeworski (2009), on the basis
of such measures, have uncovered a suggestive correlation between strikes and riots on the
one hand, and su¤rage reform on the other, it remains unclear whether this represents a
causal mechanism or not.3 The second advantage of our approach is that we can quantify
the threat for the critical period in the 19th and early 20th centuries during which the
franchise was in fact extended in Europe. Due to data limitations previous work focused
on the period after the Great War (Przeworski, 2009) or had 1880 as starting point (Kim,
2007).4 Our data allow us to start the analysis in 1820 and thus to cover the period in
3Kim (2007), for example, does not take into account unobserved country or time xed e¤ects when
estimating the e¤ect of strikes on su¤rage reform. The estimated correlation could, therefore, represent
unobserved political factors at the national level or international political shocks.
4It is di¢ cult to reconstruct data on strikes for the 19th century. The earliest data are from France,
Italy and Sweden and are recorded from the 1880s; data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the
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European history during which the franchise was actually extended.
Using these new measures of the threat of revolution, we estimate two alternative
models of franchise reform using two samples of European countries from 1820 to 1938.
We control for other potential determinants of democracy such as income, urbanization,
education, war, trade integration, social learning etc. as well as for alternative strategies
that the governing classes might have used to cope with the threat of revolution. The rst
model is a dynamic panel model with xed country and time e¤ects. Here, the outcome
variable is a measure of the number of voters as a proportion of the potential electorate.
The second model is an event history model. Here, we seek to explain the conditional
probability of a franchise reform. Both models show that the threat of revolution was
a major cause of franchise extension during the rst wave of democratization in Europe.
This lends strong support to the threat of revolution theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model of
franchise reform based on a simple extension of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). In section
3, we present our data on revolutionary events and su¤rage reform. In section 4, we
discuss issues related to identication. In sections 5 and 6, we report the evidence on the
threat of revolution theorycoming from the dynamic panel and the event history model,
respectively. In section 7, we discuss evidence related to competing theories of franchise
reform. In section 8, we conclude.
2 Theory
Our test of the threat of revolution theoryis based on the idea that revolutionary events
abroad represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elites in other countries
and may, through that channel, be a trigger of su¤rage reform. International transmission
of such information could work through a number of alternative channels.
One possibility is that the governing elites are unsure about whether a revolution is in
the making or, if it is, about what the consequences of a revolution might be. In this case,
UK are recorded from the 1890s and for other countries not until the 20th century. Thus, as documented
below, many major franchise reforms are not covered by the sample studied by Kim (2007).
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revolutionary events abroad o¤er an opportunity for the elites to learn from the experience
of others and base their decision regarding political reform on that. To formalize this logic,
we develop a simplied version of the model of franchise extension presented by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000).
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a society with an innite time horizon, t = 0; 1; :::1. It is populated by
two groups of individuals, the rich and the poor. The majority of the population is poor.
The political state (SPolt ) of the society can be either democracy (D), autocracy (A), or
a post-revolutionary regime (S), i.e., SPolt 2 fD;A;Sg. Utility is linear in income and
is discounted by the factor . We specify the per-period incomes of the members of the
two groups directly as functions of the political states and denote them by yg
 
SPolt

for
g 2 fR;Pg.5 Under autocracy, the rich control the government and no redistribution
takes place. The income of the rich is yR(A) while that of the poor is yP (A) < yR(A).
Under democracy, the poor hold the majority and use the state to redistribute income
from the rich. As a consequence, yR(A) > yR(D) > 0 and yP (A) < yP (D). Finally, in
the post-revolutionary regime, the rich fare worse than under democracy while the poor
are better o¤. To capture this, we assume that yR(S) = 0 and yP (S)  yP (D). The post-
revolutionary regime can be interpreted as socialism under which wholesale expropriation
of the assets of the rich take place, but it can also be understood simply as another type
of democracywhere the rules are (particularly) biased in favor of the poor.
The initial political state is autocracy. Regime transitions happen either through a
revolution or through democratization. We use the term revolution broadly to mean any
form of costly social transformation, whereas democratization is understood as orderly and
costless (or less costly) social transformation. The opportunities for a revolution depend
5These incomes can be derived from more fundamental assumptions about endowments, production
technologies, and tax instruments as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006). By specifying the incomes
directly, we rule out one of the strategies that the rich may use to avoid a revolution: temporary welfare
spending. The choice between welfare spending and a franchise extension is vital for understanding why
democratization has commitment value, but is less important for understanding our empirical strategy. For
this reason, we maintain this assumption, but return to the question of welfare transfers as an alternative
to franchise extension in section 4.
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on the social state (Sst 2 fG;Bg). In social state B, a revolution is impossible, while
in social state G, the poor pose a real threat to the rich and may, at a cost, stage a
revolution. This results in a transition to the post-revolutionary regime, which we assume
is an absorbing state. The cost of a revolution is measured as a fraction of the income of the
poor, (1  ) 2 (0; 1), so that the discounted income of a poor citizen after a revolution
is yP (S)
1  . To avoid a revolution, the rich can extend the franchise. This is better for
them than a revolution and, under the assumption that  < yP (D)
yP (S) , it can, in fact, prevent
a revolution from happening. With this assumption, we can ignore, in the rest of the
analysis, the possibility that the poor could, in principle, overthrow a democracy through
a revolution.
We assume that the poor observe the social state directly, so they know if a revolution
is feasible or not6 and what the cost is. The rich, on the other hand, do not observe the
social state directly. Instead they receive reports about the likely state from two sources: a
national and an international source. The national source represents information gathered
by the police and the army about home-grown revolutionary activities, news reports about
local riots, uprisings and other types of unrest, information about business cycle conditions
and so on. The international source represents information received about revolutionary
activities abroad. Such activities provide vital information to the rich about the social
state and allow them to access the risk of a revolution in their own country better. To
formalize this, we assume that at time t the posterior belief of the rich that the social state
is G at that time is
qt = F
 
q; !Nt ; !
I
t

(1)
with qt 2 (0; 1). The two variables !Nt and !It represent national and international reports
received at time t by the rich about local and international revolutionary events, respec-
tively. We assume that qt is increasing in both arguments. If no reports are received at
all, qt = F (q; ;; ;) = q 2 (0; 1) and if no international reports are received the posterior
belief is determined solely by national reports, qt = F
 
q; !Nt ; ;

= f
 
q; !Nt

. We interpret
6This is an extreme assumption. It could be relaxed by assuming that the poor, like the rich, observe
the social state imperfectly. Doing so, would strengthen the importance of information about revolutionary
events abroad.
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q as the baselinethreat of revolution and notice that since at time t the rich have yet
to receive reports for the future (

!Nt+j; !
I
t+j
	
for j = 1; 2...), they believe at time t that
qt+j = q for all j = 1; 2::::.
The timing of events within each period is as follows. If a revolution has happened in
the past, then the political state is the post-revolutionary regime, and incomes are yg(S)
for g 2 fR;Pg. If a franchise extension has happened in the past, the political state is
democracy and incomes are yg(D) for g 2 fR;Pg. If the political state is autocracy at the
beginning of period t (SPolt = A), then the following sequence of events takes place:
1. The social state Sst 2 fG;Bg is revealed to the poor, but not to the rich.
2. The rich receive the reports

!Nt ; !
I
t
	
and update their assessment of the threat of
revolution to qt = F
 
q; !Nt ; !
I
t

.
3. The rich decide whether or not to extend the franchise. If they do, the society
becomes a democracy (SPolt = D) and incomes for the period are yg(D) for g 2 fR;Pg
and the period ends. If not, stage 4 applies.
4. The poor decide whether or not to initiate a revolution. If they do, the society
experiences a transition to the post-revolutionary regime (SPolt = S) and incomes
for the period are yg(S) for g 2 fR;Pg and the period ends. If no revolution takes
place, the society continues to be an autocracy and incomes are yg(A) for g 2 fR;Pg
and the period ends.
We treat the members of the two groups as two players of a dynamic game and restrict
attention to pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria.
2.2 Analysis
Suppose that the political state is A. We begin by considering the choice of the poor in
stage 4. They know the social state and can base the revolution decision directly on that.
If the social state is B, they do not revolt and the society stays autocratic for the period.
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If, on the other hand, the social state is G, they revolt if
 >
yP (A)
yP (S) : (2)
We assume that this condition is satised. This implies that the poor will revolt in social
state G and the rich must therefore give them voting rights to avoid a revolution. Given
that, we can interpret qt as a direct measure of the (perceived) threat of revolution.
Anticipating this in stage 3, the rich decide whether or not to extend the franchise
based on the imperfect information about the social state they hold. It is useful rst to
consider the case in which the rich do not receive any reports at all so that qt = q. If
the rich decide to extend the franchise, a transition to democracy takes place and their
lifetime income is yR(D)
1  . If, on the other hand, they decide not to extend the franchise,
they face a lottery. Given their assessment of the current threat, q, the expected value of
that lottery is q  0 + (1  q)VR where
VR = yR(A) +  [q  0 + (1  q)VR] (3)
is the expected discounted value of not extending the franchise in political state A given
the baselinethreat of revolution. We can solve this equation to get that
VR =
yR(A)
1   (1  q) : (4)
We can now dene the critical value of the baselinethreat of revolution, bq, such that
without any reports, the rich are indi¤erent between extending (yR(D)
1  ) and not extending
the franchise ((1  bq)VR):
bq = (1  ) (yR(A)  yR(D))
(1  )yR(A) + yR(D) : (5)
For q < bq, the society will in the absence of any intelligence about the threat of revo-
lution su¤er a revolution the rst time the social state is G. Given their prior beliefs
about the threat of revolution q, the rich are willing to run the risk and not extend the
voting franchise, and a transition to the post-revolutionary regime will eventually happen.
Democratization, accordingly, happens when the rich receive timely intelligence reports.
The following proposition formalizes this logic.
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Proposition 1. Assume that q < bq and that  > yP (A)
yP (S) . Let t
0 be the rst period in
which the social state is G. The rich extend the franchise at time t if
qt = F
 
q; !Nt ; !
I
t

> 1  yR(D)(1   (1  q))
yR(A)(1  )  q (6)
and t  t0. Otherwise, a revolution takes place at time t0 and the society transits to the
post-revolutionary regime.
Proof. See Appendix A
The proposition links intelligence reports from national and international sources to
the franchise extension. Reports that induce the rich to update their assessment of the
threat of revolution to the critical value q triggers a franchise extension: despite the fact
that the reports are not conclusive, the rich judge that the threat at time t is so signicant
that a revolution is imminent and must be prevented by giving voting rights to the poor.
In the absence of such reports a revolution happens and the society transits to the post-
revolutionary regime. In this way, the model demonstrates how shocks to the information
set of the rich originating inside and outside the country can cause su¤rage reform and
prevent revolution.7 We shall build our estimation strategy on this, but before we discuss
this in detail, it is useful to introduce and motivate our empirical measures of the two key
variables: the threat of revolution and the extension of the franchise.
7Our theory illuminates one possible channel through which international transmission of information
a¤ects reform politics at home. This is, however, not the only possible channel through which this could
happen. Another possibility is that revolutionary events abroad are focal points for revolutionaries in
other countries. To see how this might work, consider the model of information cascades and revolutionary
regime transitions developed by Ellis and Fender (2010). In their model, the (potential) revolutionaries
do not know the true cost of revolution, while the governing elites do and can adopt various strategies
to preempt revolution, including extending the franchise. Each revolutionary has private information
about the cost. Based on this information and on observing what others are doing, each of them decides
whether to participate in a revolt. This can create an information cascade and lead to a revolution.
Suppose now that a revolutionary event happens in some other country. This could serve as a rally
call for the revolutionaries at home, making it more likely that the critical participation level to make a
revolution successful would be reached. Realizing this, the governing elites might after observing such a
revolutionary event happen in a neighboring country adopt their behavior, and rather than running the
risk that a revolution may happen, simply preempt it by extending the franchise.
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3 Data on Revolutionary Events and Franchise Re-
form
Europe is a natural choice for a test of the threat of revolution theory. During the period
from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of the Second World War, the
major European powers went through the gradual transition from absolute monarchy or
other types of autocracy to constitutional democracy. Moreover, Europe was the stage
for many of the major revolutionary events of the era and it was the existing governing
classes that in the vast majority of cases took the decision to extend the political franchise.
The development of democracy in North America and Oceania followed a very di¤erent
path as did the evolution of political institutions in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
It is for this reason that we focus our empirical investigation on a sample of European
countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938. Our main sample (the western European
sample) includes 12 western European countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom,8 France, Italy, and
Switzerland9 for which we have comprehensive data for the entire period. We also study
a broader European samplethat includes Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Romania. For these additional countries, we have
much less comprehensive data.
In order to test the threat of revolution theory, we need two primary inputs: a
quantitative measure of the franchise extension and a quantitative measure of the threat
of revolution. Our main interest is to study whether the threat of revolution was a cause
of enfranchisement of poorer social groups, as opposed to enfranchisement of, say, women
8Not including Ireland.
9For Germany, Austria and Italy, we have excluded the periods with national socialist and fascist
regimes, respectively. A country enters the sample when it becomes an independent state. This means
that Belgium and the Netherlands enter the sample in 1830; that Switzerland enters in 1848 (when a
federal structure was established); that Italy enters in 1861; that Germany enters in 1871. Norway did not
gain full independence until 1905. However, during the Union with Sweden, it kept its liberal constitution
and independent institutions, except for the foreign service, and could control its franchise rules. Finland
was an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire from the end of the Finnish War between Sweden
and Russia in 1809 until 1917 when full independence was achieved. The old four-chamber Diet was re-
activated in the 1860s and made new legislation concerning internal a¤airs. The Diet was replaced by
the Parliament of Finland in 1906. This makes it reasonable to include both Norway and Finland in the
sample from 1820 but none of our results depend on this choice.
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or the young. It is therefore natural to quantify the extension of the voting franchise by
tracking the size of the electorate in percentage of its reference age and sex group over time
and space.10 Before womens su¤rage, the reference group is all men of voting age, and
after, it is all citizens of voting age.11 This measure, which we shall call su¤rage, quanties
on a scale from 0 to 100 the impact of income, property holding, and wealth restrictions on
the proportion of the adult population allowed to vote in elections to the main legislative
chamber of the country in isolation from the e¤ect of womens su¤rage.12 It is available for
the 12 countries in our main sample only. An alternative way to characterize the process
of franchise extension is simply to record the timing of all major franchise extensions.
Information on this can be obtained for 10 additional European countries and allows us
to extend the sample with countries in eastern Europe, on the Iberian peninsula and in
the Balkans. We record the year of all major su¤rage reforms in column two of Table 1.13
Democracy arrived gradually in many of the countries, through a sequence of piecemeal
changes,14 but we note two clusters of reforms: 1848-50 and 1918-19. This is, perhaps, not
10Our data refer to the right to vote in parliamentary elections and, in countries with bicameral systems,
in elections for the lower chamber.
11This denition of democracy identies di¤erences in the de jure restrictions on political participation
across time and space. These restrictions sometime di¤ered from the de facto restrictions on political
inuence. In Germany before 1918, for example, the franchise was fairly wide, but the executive was
largely unaccountable to the parliament and, thus, to voters, and in the countryside voting was to a large
extent controlled by the landlords. Similarly, in Denmark from 1870 to 1901 the executive branch of
government was controlled by a small group of large landowners against the wishes of the majority of the
parliament and against (the spirit of) the constitution. By contrast, in Belgium the franchise was fairly
narrow till 1893, but the executive was accountable to the electorate.
12The data are constructed from Flora et al. (1983), Caramani (2000), and Cook and Paxton (1998).
We assign the value of zero to su¤rage for the years before the rst franchise reform allowed national
elections to the main legislative body based on a well-dened set of su¤rage rules. In some countries these
reforms were pre-dated by various elected or appointed advisory bodies. Examples of this include elections
for a farmers chamber in Sweden in the 1820s and in Denmark before the constitution of 1849. In the
Netherlands, the su¤rage was quite broad for a while, but was curtailed by the French and reduced under
its new royal constitution after the Vienna Congress (see Congleton, 2011). No quantitative information
exists for how broad these su¤rages were, but the historical narrative clearly indicates that they were very
narrow and often did not lead to any real inuence on public policy.
13We continue to focus on reforms that enfranchise lower socioeconomic groups by lowering income and
property requirements etc., and do not include reforms that enfranchised women, unless womens su¤rage,
as was the case in a number of countries, was part of a broader reform package that also relaxed economic
restrictions on the right to vote for men. The reform years are constructed with input from Flora et
al. (1983), Caramani (2000), Carstairs (1980), Seymour and Frary (1918) and Encyclopaedia Britannica
(1911, 2009).
14While the transition to full democracy was progressive and gradual in most countries, Italy, Austria
and Germany during the interwar period are, of course, examples of backlashes to democracy. In France,
12
a coincidence. In 1848, the Year of Revolution, a revolutionary wave swept over Europe.
The epicenter was France, but social unrest soon spread to the rest of the continent, with
revolts in several German and Italian states, in the Habsburg Empire, in Greater Poland
and elsewhere. It is well known that the French Revolution of 1848 resulted in su¤rage
reforms in France itself, but it is also noteworthy that countries, such as Denmark (1849),
Switzerland (1848), the Netherlands (1848) and Belgium (1848), which were not directly
a¤ected by the revolutionary wave, extended their franchises at the time. Likewise, the
Russian Revolution of 1917 coincides with the second wave of franchise reform.
Our test of the threat of revolution theoryis, as discussed above, based on the idea
that revolutionary events abroad represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the
elites in other countries who used this information to assess the (local) threat level and
to judge if a franchise extension was needed or not. To implement this, we have, based
on the works by Tilly (1993, 2004) and Todd (1998) and supplemented with information
from Encyclopaedia Britannica, recorded all revolutionary eventsin Europe during the
period.15 Revolutionary events are dened as those instances when for a month or more at
least two blocs of people backed by armed force and receiving support from a substantial
part of the general population exercised control over important segments of the state
organizationTilly (2004, p. 73).16
We argue i) that information about these events spread around Europe fast and, ii) that
the information was, in fact, used by the governing classes in other countries to assess the
likelihood of a home-grown revolution. We discuss each of these postulates in turn. Firstly,
even in the early part of the 19th century, news did spread fast within Europe. Stuurman
the su¤rage was narrowed after the defeat of Napoleon. Similar anti-democratic restrictions were imposed
at various points in time in Spain, Poland, and Serbia.
15Besides revolutionary events that took place in the countries included in the broader European sam-
ple, we also include events that took place in other countries in the Balkans and in Ireland.
16Some of the events recorded by Tilly (1993, 2004) refer to coup détat and civil war. We have excluded
those instances from our analysis in order to focus as closely as possible on situations where the ruling
elite was threatened by a revolution as conceptualized in the work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
Other events, such as the riots that took place at the time when the British Parliament deliberated the
Great Reform Act in 1831, were too insignicant to be counted as a revolutionary eventaccording to
Tillys denition. This does not mean that they were not important locally (in terms of our model they
would be part of national intelligence), but it does mean that we assume that they were unlikely to have
made much of an impression abroad.
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(1991), for example, discusses how news of the French Revolution in 1848 reached Dutch
merchants o¤ the coast of Africa within weeks and presumably long after the news was
known in the Netherlands itself. Likewise, news of the July revolution in Paris in 1830
was reported in English newspapers on August 3, 1830 (Brock, 1973, p. 102). Later on
in the century, as the construction of telegraph lines proceeded, news from all corners of
Europe could be spread almost instantly, not just amongst the European elites but also,
as printed media and literacy spread, amongst the general population.
Secondly, the historical record contains plenty of examples suggesting that the govern-
ing classes in other countries did use information about revolutionary events abroad to
assess the threat of revolution at home. One example is the impact that the July 1830
revolution in France had on the attitude of many British MPs to franchise reform. Some
commentators at the time, in fact, suggested that news of the July revolution triggered
the demand for franchise reform in Britain by making the governing classes aware of the
threat of revolution. While it is probably an exaggeration that intelligence about the rev-
olution in France had a major impact on the election to the British parliament in July
1830, it helped determine, not who was elected, but how those elected behaved when the
new House met(Brock, 1973, p. 103) and in that way served as a source of information
about the risk of revolution. In a similar fashion, the news of the revolution in France in
1848 gave the Chartists in Britain a boost and triggered mass rallies across the country.17
The fact that 80,000 volunteered as Special Constables in support of the existing political
order again shows how news about revolutions abroad spurred the governing classes and
their supporters into action to preempt revolution. Another example is the impact that
the European revolutions of 1848 had in Denmark and in the Netherlands. In Denmark
throughout the 1830s and 1840s, a fast growing bourgeoisie had demanded a share in gov-
ernment. It was, however, not until news of the bloody revolutions in France and Germany
in 1848 and of the attempt by Schleswig and Holstein to get integrated into the German
Confederation spread to Copenhagen that King Frederick VII gave in to the reform de-
mands and accepted a constitutional monarchy and franchise extension (see, e.g. Collier,
17See Saville (1987, p. 227-228).
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1999, pp. 33-34). Along similar lines, Stuurman (1991, p. 464) summarizes the situation
in the Netherlands in 1848 as follows: although the Netherlands did not experience any-
thing like a violent revolution in 1848, the political events of that year assuredly deviated
from the normal course of Dutch politics[...] the fundamental cause of the non-violent
revolution in the Netherlands is without doubt to be found in the European revolutions,
notably those in France, Germany and Austria.Finally, the Russian Revolution in 1917
played a key role for the wave of reforms at the end of World War I. In her discussion of the
e¤ect of the war on su¤rage reform in western Europe, Collier (1999, p. 78) remarks that
heightened working-class pressure [in Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Finland] was surely
activated as much by the Russian Revolution as by World War I. From the side of the
working class, what perhaps changed most was not the greater force of its pro-democratic
agitation, but the revolutionary rather than the democratic example of the Russian Revo-
lution. In all these examples, news about revolutionary events abroad play a central role
to the reform decisions reached by the elites.
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix B detail all the revolutionary events included in our
sample, but we have for illustrative purposes singled out the years of the events and
recorded them in Table 1. For the purpose of the statistical analysis, we construct three
di¤erent indicators of the threat of revolution as perceived by the governing class of country
i in year t (TRkit). Let Rjt be the number of revolutionary events that took place in country
j in year t and let Dkij be the distancebetween country i and country j where k 2 fu; g; lg
is an index for particular distance measures. Then, we can dene the threat of revolution
in country i at time t as
TRkit =
X
j 6=i
Rjt
Dkij
: (7)
The most elementary indicator, k = u, is just an unweighted sum of the number of
revolutionary events in each year, i.e., Duij = 1 for all i and j with i 6= j. The two
other indicators recognize that events that happened far away from a given country might
have had less e¤ect on the perceived threat level than events that happened closer to
home. This would be consistent with the theoretical framework developed above. We use
two alternative measures of distance. The rst distance measure, k = g, is geographical
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distance in kilometers between the capitals of the country pair. The second distance
measure, k = l, is linguistic distance. Following Fearon (2003), we use the number of
common branches in the linguistic tree for each pair of countries to measure how closely
related their languages are.18 Arguably, sharing a common language and geographical
proximity are both plausible transmission channels for information about revolutionary
events.19 We construct each of the three indicators using the subset of major events
indicated with bold face in Table 1 as well as all the events.20 We stress that we exclude
nationalrevolutionary events, i.e., events within a country itself, in all these calculations.
The rationale for doing so is strong. While revolutionary events in other countries are, as
argued above, exogenous to the reform politics of neighboring countries, events within a
country itself are, by denition, related to local politics and could therefore be correlated
with unobserved determinants of franchise reform that have nothing to do with the threat
of revolution. By excluding these events e.g. the e¤ect that the revolution in France in
1848 had on France itself we hope to avoid this problem.
<Table 1: The timing of Su¤rage Reforms and Revolutionary Events in Europe, 1820-
1938.>
4 Estimation Strategy
To introduce our strategy for testing the threat of revolution theory, let i denote the index
for a particular country and let fit be a measure of the franchise extension (or reform)
at time t in country i. We can then express the franchise as a function of the perceived
threat of revolution qit, other observable determinants of the franchise Xit, country-specic
xed e¤ects i, time-specic e¤ects t; and unobserved time-varying determinants of the
18We use the dominant language group, except for Switzerland and Belgium where we base the calcu-
lation on a population weighted average. The linguistic tree contains up to 15 nested categories and Dlij
is dened as
q
15 #commonij
15 ; where #commonij is the number of common branches in the tree between
the language of country i and j.
19One could also consider using some measure of economic proximity, such as the extent of bilateral
trade. For most countries, we can only trace this variable back to 1870. This alternative is therefore
impractical for our purpose.
20The reason for zooming in on the major events is that some of the minor events might not have been
widely noted at the time in other countries and so should be given zero weight.
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franchise it:
fit = qit +Xit + i + t + it: (8)
Motivated by the model presented in section 2, we approximate the perceived threat of
revolution in country i at time t by a linear equation:
qit = 1!
N
it + 2!
I
it + i + t; (9)
where i is the country-specic baseline threat and t represents common shifts in the
threat level that a¤ect all countries at the same time, e.g., the ghost of revolutionor
rally calls. Combining these two equations, we get
fit = 1!
N
it + 2!
I
it +Xit + (i + i) + (t + t) + it: (10)
In practice, we do not observe the national intelligence reports and they become part of
the error term. We can write equation (10) as
fit = !
I
it +Xit + 'i + t + "it; (11)
where  = 2, 'i = (i + i), t = (t + t) and "it = it + 1!
N
it . This is the
equation that we take to the data. To estimate the causal e¤ect of the threat of revolution
on the franchise, i.e., the parameter , it must be true that our empirical proxy for !Iit,
conditional on the (other) observable determinants of the franchise included in the vector
Xit (to be discussed below) and on country and time xed e¤ects, is uncorrelated with all
unobserved determinants of the franchise, i.e. that cov("it; !Iit
Xit; 'i; t) = 0. This, in
turn, requires (1) that the error term it is (conditionally) uncorrelated with !
I
it and (2)
that !Iit is (conditionally) uncorrelated with !
N
it . We discuss these two conditions in turn.
An important strand of literature argues that franchise extension originates from in-
ternal political competition within the elite of a country and, as such, is unrelated to the
threat of revolution (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Llavador and Oxoby, 2005). The ex-
tent and importance of such internal rivalry is hard to quantify for the purpose of statistical
analysis and will, therefore, in practice be captured by it. Internal political competition
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and other such unobserved factors21 are unlikely to be a cause of revolutions abroad. Nei-
ther the Danish liberal and national movements the main advocates for su¤rage reform
in Denmark in the 1840s nor the Danish King had any inuence on the revolutionary
events in France and Germany. Likewise, the power balance between pro-reform Whigs
and Radicals and anti-reform Tories (and the King) in Britain did not a¤ect the July
revolution in France in 1830. The Russian Revolution was not caused by the political
situation in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, or Finland and so on. It is therefore reasonable
to maintain that revolutionary shocks abroad are (conditionally) uncorrelated with this
type of internal political rivalry.22
However, there is another reason why it could be correlated with !
I
it. In the formula-
tion of the theoretical argument above, we did not allow the rich to adopt other strategies
than franchise extension to combat the threat of revolution. In practice, as well as in
Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) model, other strategies play a role. Firstly, the rich
could o¤er welfare transfers or other benets to the poor and in that way eliminate their
incentive to participate in a revolution.23 Secondly, the rich may invest in repression and
use the police or the army to eliminate any threat of revolution. The implication of this,
then, is that the perceived threat of revolution may trigger franchise reform, but only if
that particular coping strategy is chosen over the alternatives. Importantly, according
to this logic, repression and welfare transfers are negatively correlated with the franchise
extension but positively correlated with the threat of revolution. As a consequence, if we
cannot control for the degree of repression or for welfare spending and as we shall see,
it is di¢ cult to do so the extent to which these strategies were used become part of it.
21As we discuss below, there are other theories of franchise extension (e.g. modernization and enlight-
enment, war, and trade integration) than those based on rivalry within the elite, which are also unrelated
to the threat of revolution. However, we are able to control for each of these in the estimations and so,
they are less likely to show up in the error term.
22Although it is possible that some domestic political factions would have an incentive to block news
about revolutionary events abroad to further domestic political ends, it is virtually impossible to imagine
that this could be done e¤ectively in the European countries in the sample. In contrast, it is interesting
to note that this did in fact happen throughout the Caribbean following the Haitian Revolution. This was
made possible by strong social control and low levels of literacy.
23The drawback of this coping strategy is that it is only credible when the threat of revolution is real (in
the model when the social state is G). For this reason, it will often be insu¢ cient to head o¤ a revolution
and the rich must resort to franchise reform.
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Our estimate of  will then be biased down towards zero.
We also require that the correlation between national and international intelligence re-
ports is zero. Unconditionally, this is unlikely to be the case. In fact, our causal mechanism
international transmission of information about the risk of revolution presumes that
the elite of one country can learn about the risk of a home-grown revolution by observing
revolutionary events abroad. This requires (positive) cross-country correlation between
factors that make revolutions likely or not (in the model between the social states). If we,
moreover, presume that national and international reports about revolutionary activities
are more likely to emerge when there really is a risk of revolution, national and interna-
tional reports will, ceteris paribus, tend to be (positively) correlated. If unchecked, this
creates upward bias in the estimate of , and it is therefore important that we condi-
tion on the factors that generate this correlation in order to ensure that !Iit and !
N
it are
conditionally uncorrelated.
The most important factor that could cause such a correlation is the business cycle.
If, for example, the business cycle contains an international component and the threat or
revolution is systematically related to economic hardship, then the conditions for revolution
would be (positively) correlated across countries. This, in turn, means that national
intelligence reports would be correlated with the international business cycle which, in
turn, may be a driver of revolutionary activities abroad. In practice, we deal with this
concern by controlling for local business cycle conditions, both directly by conditioning
on variables related to the state of the national trade cycle and indirectly by including
common time xed e¤ects in the estimations.
The rally call e¤ectis another factor that could generate a positive correlation between
national and international reports about the threat of revolution. Suppose, for example,
that a revolutionary event happens in some country. This is observed by revolutionaries
abroad for whom it serves as a rally call, thus making revolution more likely there. As
a consequence, national intelligence reports about the risk of revolution may reach the
local elite. This phenomenon, however, is captured by the common time xed e¤ects in
equation (9) and is, we believe, less of a concern.
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With this discussion in mind, we estimate two versions of equation (11) to test the
threat of revolution theory: a dynamic panel model (section 5) and an event history
model (section 6). The panel model is estimated on the western European sample, while
the event history model also makes use of the broader European sample.
5 The Dynamic Panel Model
In the dynamic panel model, the dependent variable is su¤rage and, as the baseline, we
consider the following specication:
su¤rageit = su¤rageit 1 + TR
k
it +Xit 5 + 'i + t + "it; (12)
where 'i is a country xed e¤ect (for each of the 12 countries in the western European
sample), t is a time xed e¤ect and "it is an error term with E ("it) = 0. In the baseline
specication, we use two-year time xed e¤ects rather than yearly time dummies to avoid
a multicollinearity problem, but we return to this issue below.24 The vector Xit 5 includes
other potential determinates of the su¤rage, typically lagged by ve years (to be discussed
below). To capture the strong path dependency in the evolution of franchise institutions,
we include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.
The evolution of the voting franchise is likely to be a¤ected by many factors other than
the threat of revolution. We include as many of these as possible in the vectorX.25 Firstly,
the modernization hypothesis, as formulated by, for example, Lipset (1960), stresses the
gradual increase in income, improvement in education attainment, and the process of
urbanization as major causes of democratization. We control for these factors by including
GDP per capita, the urbanization rate, and a dummy variable, educational attainment, that
is equal to one once enrollment in primary education surpasses 60 per cent and zero before
then. Secondly, Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008) and others have argued that trade
24The problem is that the year xed e¤ects are (almost) perfectly collinear with the three indicators of
the threat of revolution.
25The precise denitions of all control variables and their sources are given in Appendix B. In the
baseline specications, we only include variables for which we have data covering the entire sample period
from 1820. In extensions, we add a number of other variables for which we only have partial coverage.
We postpone the discussion of these other variables to section 7.
20
integration causes democratization. In the baseline specications, we control for this by
including a dummy variable, gold standard, that is equal to one if a country is on the
gold standard and zero otherwise. The idea is that being on the gold standard reduces
trading costs and indirectly encourages trade integration. We acknowledge that this is an
imperfect proxy. Its main virtue is that it, in contrast to more direct measures of trade
integration considered in Section 7, can be tracked back to 1820. Thirdly, the size of the
country may matter. One reason, suggested by Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), is that a
larger population means that there are more shoulders to bear the xed cost associated
with institutional innovations. Consequently, more populous countries should be more
inclined to adopt franchise reforms with large xed costs. To control for this, we include a
measure of the size of the population (population). All these control variables are lagged
by ve years to reduce the risk of simultaneity bias.
Fourthly, Janowitz (1976) and, more recently, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) have argued
that mass conscription armies and war contributed to the development of democratic
institutions in Europe and elsewhere. We control for this by including a dummy variable,
war, that records whether a country was at war in a given year.26 World War I (1914-1918)
was a major shock to the political and economic order. It might not only have a¤ected
the countries that were directly involved, but also the rest of Europe. To control for this
and to isolate the e¤ect of the Russian Revolution in 1917 from the general e¤ect of the
Great War, we include a dummy variable, WWI, that is equal to one for all 12 countries
during the period 1914-18. Finally, Gleditsch and Ward (2006), Persson and Tabellini
(2009) and others have argued that the decision to introduce democracy by the political
elites of one country may a¤ect the decision to democratize in other countries. To allow
for such spillover e¤ects, we include the following measure of social learning in the model:
social learning it =
X
j 6=i
DEMjt
Dkij
; (13)
where Dkij is either the distance in kilometers from country i to country j (k = g) or
the linguistic distance between the two (k = l) and DEMjt counts the total number of
26We do not include colonial wars in this. Data on the size of armies exist (see, e.g., Flora et al., 1987),
but do not cover much of the early part of the 19th century and are not suitable for our purpose.
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franchise reforms undertaken by country j by year t. If social learning was important, we
should nd a positive coe¢ cient to this variable.
5.1 Evidence from the Dynamic Panel Model
The main results of the panel model are reported in Table 2.27 Columns one to three
in Table 2 show the results for the three di¤erent measures of the threat of revolution
when equation (12) is estimated with a xed e¤ects estimator.28 In all specications,
the threat of revolution is signicant at the ve percent level or better. Not surprisingly,
the e¤ect is smaller, but still statistically signicant, when we use the broadest denition
of what constitutes a revolutionary event (see column four). The presence of the lagged
dependent variable on the right-hand side, however, implies that the xed e¤ects estimator
is biased, albeit the bias is likely to be very small since our panel covers more than 100
years.29 The bias can be avoided by using the GMM-system estimator30 (Blundell and
Bond, 1998) or the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (Bruno,
2005). Very similar results emerge when the model is estimated using these estimators (see
columns ve to eight). Overall, we therefore conclude that the threat of revolution was a
statistically signicant and, we argue, a causal determinant of the franchise extension in
western Europe. The magnitude of the e¤ect can best be grasped by considering the point
estimate from column one of Table 2; which reports the specication with the unweighted
measure of the threat. The short-run e¤ect of an extrarevolutionary event somewhere
in Europe is that it increases the franchise by just under two percentage points in the
average country. The high degree of persistence in the franchise, however, implies that the
long-run e¤ect is much larger: around 33 percentage points.
The estimations shown in Table 2 do not make any attempt to control for three factors
27We postpone the discussion of evidence on competing theories to section 7.
28We allow for panel heteroskedasticity and for spatial correlations between the error terms across
countries, and we base inference on panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs), as recommended by Beck
and Katz (1995).
29For a xed number of countries, the bias disappears in the limit as the number of time periods goes to
innity. In practice, however, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the bias is negligible for panels
that cover more than 20 years.
30With only 12 countries, it is not clear, however, that a GMM estimator is preferable to the xed
e¤ects estimator.
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that the Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) theory of su¤rage reform highlights as being
important: business cycle shocks, repression of revolutionary activities, and temporary
transfers to the poor. Table 3 shows some specications that take these factors into
account. Firstly, we have constructed a measure of the business cycle, cycle, by extracting
the cyclical component of GDP per capita using a Hodrick-Prescott lter.31 Since riots and
other types of social unrest typically build up during times of hardship, we expect that the
governing classes revised their estimate of the likelihood of a revolution upwards during a
recession making su¤rage reform more likely then and vice versa. A specication including
cycle (and the trend component of GDP per capita, trend) is shown in column one of Table
3. We see that controlling for the state of the cycle reduces, as one would expect if the
cycle is negatively correlated with threat of revolution and positively correlated across
countries, the size of the point estimate on TRgit but not its signicance. The e¤ect of
cycle itself is insignicant.
Secondly, if the elites could prevent a revolution through repression or by o¤ering
temporary transfers to the poor, it would, according to Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000)
theory, be preferred to a (permanent) extension of the franchise. As discussed above,
failure to control for this biases the estimate of the threat of revolution downwards. As
a proxy for repression, we use data on the share of the public budget spent on policing
and defence (repression) and as a measure of temporary transferswe use the share of
the public budget spent on health, education, housing and various government-sponsored
insurance and welfare programs (temporary transfers). The results are reported in columns
two and three of Table 3. Despite the fact that the sample size is signicantly reduced,
the threat of revolution continues to have a highly signicant and positive e¤ect on the
franchise. The point estimates on repression and temporary transfers are negative as
predicted by the theory but not statistically signicant.32
Table 3 shows three further specications. Firstly, the baseline specications assume
31We have tried a number of other lters. It makes no di¤erence to the results which one is being used.
32We have re-estimated the specications without including the two variables repression and temporary
transfers on the restricted sample to judge the size of the potential downwards bias. We nd that the
coe¢ cient to TRg is 1.95 (compared to 1.98) for the repression sample, whereas it is 1.33 (compared to
1.33) for the temporary transfers sample. These point estimates suggest that the bias induced by not
being able to control for these alternative coping strategies in the main specications is very small.
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that international news about revolutionary events abroad reached the governing classes
in other countries within a year. As discussed in detail above, the historical evidence
supports this assumption. Yet, it is important to check the robustness of the results by
allowing for a longer window of opportunity. The specication shown in column four lags
TRgit by one year and thus allows for a two-year window. The point estimate is 0:99 as
compared to 1:22 with a one-year window, but still signicant at the ve percent level.
Secondly, since all countries in the western European sample, with the exception of the
United Kingdom and France, did not have regular elections by 1820 (su¤rage is coded
zero) and all countries had universal male su¤rage towards the end of the sample period
(su¤rage is coded 100), the dependent variable, su¤rage, is censored. In column ve of
Table 3, we show what happens when we use a Tobit estimator to take this into account.
We see that it does not make much di¤erent to the results. Thirdly, our measures of the
threat of revolution are serially correlated by construction. This can, as pointed out by
Bertrand et al. (2004), generate a spurious correlation, in our case, between su¤rage and
TRkit. To see if this is a problem, we show in column six a specication that clusters the
error terms at the country level. Again, we see that it does not make much of a di¤erence.
<Table 2: Results for the Panel Model I>
<Table 3: Results for the Panel Model II>
There are three other issues related to identication, to common time e¤ects, and
to stationarity that are su¢ ciently important to warrant detailed considered before we
present the results from the event history study.
Decomposing the Variation in the Threat of Revolution The variation in the
(weighted) measures of the threat of revolution comes from three sources: rstly, over
time variation; secondly, cross-country variation due to the fact that we omit revolutionary
events happening within a country itself; and thirdly cross-country variation generated by
di¤erences in geographical or linguistic distance to the epicenter of each revolutionary
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event. The variation created by excluding national revolutionary events is non-random.33
Since only France is a¤ected by own revolutionary events in the western European sample,
we can confront the non-randomness generated in this way simply by dropping France from
the sample. Doing so, makes no di¤erence to the results [not reported].
More importantly, we can disentangle the two remaining sources of variation by pos-
tulating that gTRkit = eX
j 6=i
Rjt + eX
j 6=i
RjtD
k
ij (14)
The rst term picks up the over-time variation in the threat level (and we expect thate > 0). This may, in the absence of year xed e¤ects, be confounded by simultaneous
movements in political unrest and franchise extension (see below). The second term isolates
the cross-country variation generated by di¤erences in distance to the events. This source
of variation is unquestionably exogenous and we expect that e < 0. Re-estimating the
partial adjustment model withgTRgit, we nd that34
suffrageit = 0:941suffrageit 1
(0:012)
+ ::+ 3:49
(0:23)
X
j 6=i
Rjt   0:0019
(0:011)
X
j 6=i
DgijRjt + :::. (15)
We see that the signs are as expected and that both sources of variation are contributing
to the identication of the e¤ect of the threat of revolution. The fact that the estimate
of e, which is identied purely from the cross-country variation generated by distance to
revolutionary events, is negative and statistically signicant is a strong indication that we
have identied a causal mechanism.
Common Time Fixed E¤ects We are aware that the results reported in Tables 2 and
3 could be interpreted as evidence of a simultaneous over-time change in revolutionary
mood the ghost of revolutionand franchise extension, rather than as a causal e¤ect of
revolutionary threat. It is also possible that a sudden spur of enlightenmentin a particular
33Countries that experience a revolutionary event are coded as being exposed to lower revolutionary
threat in that year than the rest of the countries. To the extent that revolutionary events within a country
are correlated with su¤rage reform, this creates a spurious correlation between the three measures of the
threat of revolution and su¤rage. If the correlation is positive, the consequence is a downwards bias.
34The control variables are the same as in the specications reported in Table 2, but to conserve space,
we do not report the point estimates here. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket under the
coe¢ cient.
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year across all the countries in the sample could reduce the threat of a revolution and
simultaneously trigger su¤rage reforms. The time xed e¤ects are included to address this
concern. However, since we use two-year average time e¤ects to avoid a multicollinearity
problem, it is possible that ghost of revolutionor enlightenmentshocks could play a
role if within a two-year period there happened to be more revolutionary events and more
su¤rage reforms in the second than in the rst year. To investigate this further, we adopt
the method of Plümper and Troeger (2007) to estimate the time e¤ects separately from
the impact of our measure of the threat of revolution. In particular, we, rst, estimate a
specication of equation (12) with one-year time xed e¤ects but withoutWWI and TRkit.
Next, we regress the estimated year xed e¤ects on these two variables. The residuals from
this regression along with WWI and TRkit are then included in the original specication.
The results are
su¤rageit = 0:938
(0:011)
su¤rageit 1 + ::::+ 1:70
(0:23)
TRuit + 0:79
(0:66)
WWIt (16)
su¤rageit = 0:935
(0:011)
su¤rageit 1 + ::::+ 0:99
(0:13)
TRgit + 1:32
(0:66)
WWIt (17)
su¤rageit = 0:929
(0:011)
su¤rageit 1 + ::::+ 12:8
(3:83)
TRlit + 1:38
(0:48)
WWIt: (18)
We do not report the coe¢ cients for the control variables (which are the same as in Table
2) and the standard errors are shown in brackets under the coe¢ cient estimates. The
estimated e¤ect of TRuit and TR
g
it are somewhat smaller than before while the e¤ect of
TRlit is a little larger, but all estimates continue to be highly signicant. However, for
WWI the e¤ect is more dramatic. In fact, the variable changes sign from negative to
positive suggesting that common time xed e¤ects are more of an issue when evaluating
the Janowitz thesisthan the threat of revolution theory.
Stationarity Su¤rage as well as several of the control variables are trending up and
may be or behave as if they were non-stationary.35 This raises questions regarding the
interpretation of the results reported in Tables 2 and 3. To confront this issue, we estimate
an Error Correction Model for su¤rage, using OLS with panel corrected standard errors,
35Dickey-Fuller tests on the individual series suggest in several cases that we cannot reject non-
stationarity of the series [not reported].
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as suggested by Beck (2001). In particular, we estimate
su¤rageit = 1TR
g
it +Xit 5 (19)
+e  su¤rageit 1   1TRgit 1  Xit 6!+ "it;
where the term in parenthesis is the long-run relation appropriately adjusted to match our
other estimations and the parameter e captures the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
The estimated equation is36
su¤rageit = 1:38
(0:23)
TRgit + :::  0:041
(0:0097)

su¤rageit 1   48:0
(11:03)
TRgit 1   ::

: (20)
Again, we have suppressed the control variables (which are the same as in Table 2) and
only report results for TRgit. The coe¢ cients reported in equation (20) are all signicant
at the one percent level. The equation implies a positive short-run e¤ect of changes in
the threat of revolution on changes in su¤rage. More importantly, we nd a substantial
long-run e¤ect. The negative estimate of e implies adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
All in all, this suggests that our results are not an artifact of non-stationary data.
6 Event History Model
The variable su¤rage records the size of the electorate and allows us to study the gradual
evolution of the franchise over time and space. An alternative approach is to record and
study the timing of major franchise reforms. One advantage of this shift in emphasis
is that we can then extend the sample with countries from Eastern Europe, the Iberian
peninsula and the Balkans.
To facilitate such an event history study, we code, using the information from Table 1,
the dependent variable yit as 1 if country i introduced a franchise reform in year t and as
0 in the years before and after that. A country drops out of the sample in the year after
universal male su¤rage was reached or if it regressed into dictatorship. We do not know
precisely when a country became at riskof becoming democratic. So we deal with the
problem of left censoring by assuming that countries enter the risk seteither in 1820 or at
36The gures in brackets underneath the coe¢ cients are robust standard errors.
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the time of independence. These data are grouped duration data. It is, therefore, natural
to use a duration model to estimate the relationship between the threat of revolution and
the time conditional probability of su¤rage reform (the hazard rate). We follow Beck et
al. (1998) and estimate the following discrete logistic model:
P
 
yit = 1jTRkit; Xit;Mt 1 = 0

=
1
1 + e (TR
k
it+Xit+H(:))
; (21)
where Xit is the vector of control variables (chosen from among those discussed above).
The variable Mt 1 is an indicator variable that is equal to 0 in each year before universal
male su¤rage and equal to 1 thereafter. We allow for duration dependence in the hazard
rate through the function H (:).37
6.1 The Western European Sample
We begin by reporting results based on the western European sample.38 We control for
the same co-variates as before. The main results paint the same picture as that emerging
from the dynamic panel model: the threat of revolution increased the probability of su¤rage
reform signicantly. The rst four columns of Table 4 show the logit estimates for each of
the measures of the threat of revolution. We see that they all are positive and statistically
signicant at the ve percent level or better. The magnitude of the e¤ect can be illustrated
by considering the odds ratio. Based on the estimate reported in column one of Table 4,
one extra revolutionary event increases the odds that a country will introduce a major
su¤rage reform in that year by 108 percent. This is a substantial e¤ect.
These estimations, however, do not take into account that democratizations are rare
events.39 The fact that they are may magnify any systematic bias of the reported maximum
likelihood estimates. King and Zeng (2001) have developed an estimator that corrects for
37The argument of the function is t  tpi where tpi represents either the year in which country i enters the
risk set(i.e., either 1820 or the year of independence) or the year of the previous franchise reform within
the sample period. We estimate H (:) using natural cubic splines and use the estimated spline coe¢ cients
along with the cumulation of years since the last reform (or since entry to the sample) to model duration
dependence. We have determined the number of knots by a sequence of F-tests and have settled on a
specication with two knots.
38Germany and Switzerland cannot be included in the event history study because they introduced full
male su¤rage at the time they became nation states.
39In the western European sample, years with su¤rage reform constitute less than four percent of the
total number of cases.
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this bias. We have re-estimated all the models using this estimator and report the results
of one of these re-estimations in column ve. We see that the coe¢ cient on TRgit continues
to be statistically signicant at the one percent level. The same is true with the other
measures of the threat of revolution [not reported]. Another limitation of the logit model is
that the baseline hazard rate, while admitting duration dependency as discussed above,40
does not include a country-specic component. In column one of Table 5, we report the
results from a specication in which the baseline hazard rate is a¤ected by idiosyncratic
country-specic shocks. A comparison between the estimates from this random e¤ects
logit model and those reported in Table 4 reveals very little di¤erence. Table 5 also
reports specications that allow for clustering of the standard errors at the country level,
control for the cyclic component of GDP, spending on repression and temporary transfers
or allow for a one-year delay in the ow of information. In all cases, the threat of revolution
continues to be a signicant predictor of the timing of franchise reforms.
<Table 4: Results from the Event History Model I>
<Table 5: Results from the Event History Model II>
6.2 The Broader European Sample
All the countries in the main sample are western European and in actual fact achieved uni-
versal manhood su¤rage within the sample period. In other parts of Europe, in particular
in eastern Europe, on the Balkans, and on the Iberian peninsula, the evolution of democ-
racy was more sporadic and many of these countries did not become fully consolidated
democracies until the third wave of democratization. Yet, they did take the rst steps
towards democracy by extending the franchise to broader segments of the populations be-
fore World War I or just after, following a pattern not all that dissimilar to that followed
in western Europe. Seymour and Frary (1918: pp. 151-152), for example, note about
Russia in 1905 that by these extensions [of the franchise], the right to vote was given to
the vast majority of the people. Although, voting continued to be indirect and subject
40A likelihood ratio test indicates strong duration dependence in the baseline hazard rate, and all the
specications shown allow the hazard rate to be time-dependent.
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to o¢ cial control, this did constitute a signicant broadening of political participation.
Spain extended the franchise gradually over the course of the 19th century and arrived at
universal male su¤rage by 1890 (Ortega and Blanco, 1990). On the Balkans, Greece had
a relatively democratic constitution from 1844 onwards, while Serbia had a parliament
(Skupshtina) from 1869, which was elected by universal su¤rage, whose only aristocratic
element consisted of a certain number of deputies appointed by the prince (Seymour and
Frary, 1918, pp. 251-252). A further franchise reform took place in 1888. Bulgaria was
created after the Russian-Turkish war (1877-78) with semi-democratic institutions based
on universal manhood su¤rage but with signicant powers vested in the King. Romania
had a very restricted franchise throughout the 19th century but introduced a manhood
su¤rage subject to a literacy test in 1918. Consequently, seen from the perspective of the
19th century, it is not so clear that our sample of western European countries is system-
atically di¤erent from the fullEuropean sample. Nevertheless, it is important to subject
the threat of revolution theoryto a test based on a broader sample of countries.
To this end, we have, as noted above, collected information on su¤rage reforms in
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ro-
mania (see Table 1) and re-estimated the event history model on this broader sample of
countries.41 The down-side is that we are unable to control for competing theories of
franchise reform, except for the inuence of war, and, in a few countries, for GDP per
capita and population. The results are shown in Table 6. The rst four columns report
the results for the maximum sample of 20 countries, while the last four columns report
specications with additional control variables, but without Russia, Serbia, Iceland, and
Luxembourg. Looking across the two top rows of the table, we see that all measures of
the threat of revolution have a positive and highly statistically signicant impact on the
likelihood of su¤rage reform. The historical narrative clearly demonstrates that repression
was common currency in Russia and eastern Europe. Since we are not controlling for this
in the estimations reported in Table 6, we expect a downwards bias in the estimate of the
41Hungary, Poland and Serbia are included from independence till the end of the sample period in 1938.
Romania drops out in 1937, when it becomes a dictatorship. Russia drops out in 1923 when the civil war
ended. Spain and Portugal drop out in 1936 and 1926, respectively, when they become dictatorships.
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threat of revolution e¤ect. It is, therefore, not overly surprising that the estimated e¤ects
are smaller in magnitude than those reported for the western European sample in Table
4. In conclusion, our results suggest that the threat of revolution was a major impulse
of democratization not only within western Europe narrowly dened, but in Europe more
widely.
[Table 6: Results from the Event History Model III.
Estimates of the probability of a su¤rage reform, 1820-1938, Broader European Sam-
ple]
7 Other Results
Our main purpose is to test the threat of revolution theory. However, our empirical
investigation can also speak to the relevance of competing theories of su¤rage reform.
Some of the alternative theories require us to augment the baseline models estimated on
the western European sample with additional variables for which we only got partial time
or country coverage. The results of these additional estimations are reported in Tables 7
and 8. We notice that in all these additional specications the evidence supporting the
threat of revolution theoryremains strong and so, in what follows, we focus our discussion
on the evidence related to the competing theories.
The Janowitz thesisthat war and the emergence of conscription armies were important
impulses for democratic reform in Europe receives some support. In the panel model,
the coe¢ cient on war is consistently positive and highly signicant. Based on the point
estimates reported in columns one to four in Table 2, being at war, ceteris paribus, increases
the franchise by between 3.5 and 4.2 percentage points in the short-run, with the long-run
e¤ect being about 17 times larger. The e¤ect is, however, not signicant in the event
history study (see, e.g., Table 4). It is interesting to notice that WWI, according to our
estimates, by itself did not contribute signicantly to the extension of the franchise in
Europe. In the panel model, this may, however, be due to the high correlation with the
two-year time e¤ects. This suspicion is conrmed when we estimate the time e¤ects using
the method suggested by Plümper and Troeger (2007). In this case, the e¤ect of WWI falls
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into line with the Janowitz thesisshowing a positive and sometimes signicant e¤ect on
the franchise extension (see equations (16) to (18)). The dummy variables war and WWI
are crude proxies for the e¤ect of war and do not take into account the scale of war. In
column four of Tables 7 and 8, we have replaced the two dummy variables with a measure
of the number of war deaths war-intensity and we nd a positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect of this on the franchise in the panel model, but not in the event history
model.42
In the baseline specications, we use the variable gold standard to proxy for trade in-
tegration, and based on this, there is no evidence supporting the trade-causes-democracy
thesis. To investigate the robustness of this non-nding, we have replaced the gold stan-
dard dummy variable with two more direct measures of trade integration, represented by
the variables trade volume and wheat price spread, respectively in Tables 7 and 8. The
variable trade volume records the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP. The vari-
able wheat price spread is a measure of trade costs proposed by Jacks (2005) based on
convergence in wheat prices across time and space.43 It is a problem for both of these
measures that we lose between 200 and 650 observations. As can be seen from column
one of Table 7, trade volume is signicant in the panel model, but insignicant in the
event history model (see column one of Table 8). Both specications, however, show the
expected positive sign, giving some credence to the trade-causes-democracythesis. The
measure of trade costs based on the wheat price spread is insignicant.
In contrast to Persson and Tabellini (2009), we nd no evidence that being located in a
democratic neighborhoodencourages democracy. On the contrary, in the few cases where
the variable social learning is statistically signicant, it has a negative sign, suggesting
democratic reforms in neighboring countries had a negative e¤ect on democratic reforms
at home. Occasionally, population size has a positive and signicant impact.
None of the modernization variables, i.e. GDP per capita, urbanization rate and educa-
tion attainment, seem to have mattered much. In the few cases in which a modernization
variable is signicant it appears to have a negative e¤ect on democracy. The same message
42This is based on information from the correlates of wardata set, see Singer and Small (1994).
43See also Jacks et al. (2010).
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comes from the specications shown in Tables 7 and 8 where we control for agricultural
share to capture the impact of industrialization.44 This is not encouraging for modern-
ization theory.45
<Table 7: Additional Results for Panel Model.>
<Table 8: Additional Results for the Event History Model.>
8 Conclusion
This paper provides systematic, statistical evidence that the threat of revolution played
a pivotal role for the evolution of su¤rage rights in Europe in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. Our various measures of the threat are consistently one of the main determinants
of the extension of the franchise during this period and we believe that the results represent
a causal e¤ect. The analysis lends strong support to one of the key building blocks of the
theory of su¤rage reform developed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006). Of course,
this is just one factor in accepting the theory. The evidence on the key implication of the
theory, namely that the franchise extension should be related to bigger government and
more redistribution, is, on the other hand, more mixed. In particular, the evidence from
western Europe for the period casts doubt on the simple hypothesis that su¤rage reforms
caused a big and immediate expansion of government, see e.g. Aidt et al. (2006) and Aidt
and Jensen (2009a,b).46
Taking a long historical perspective also sheds new light on the Janowitz thesisthat
war was an important impulse for democratic reform. Here, in contrast to, for example,
Przeworski (2009), we nd some evidence that it was. This lends support to the approach
to endogenous democratization taken recently by Ticchi and Vindigni (2009). Our results
44In contrast to modernization theory, Congleton (2004) emphasizes that structural change empowers
new pro-democracy lobby groups and inuences the constitutional bargaining process in that way.
45For further discussion of the relevance of modernization theory, see Barro (1999), Boix (2009) and
Gundlach and Paldam (2009) who reported evidence of a positive relationship between GDP and various
measures of democracy, and Acemoglu et al. (2008) who cast doubt on the causal nature of this evidence.
See also Przeworski et al. (2000) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997).
46In contrast, Husted and Kenny (1997) do nd evidence of a large positive e¤ect of su¤rage reform
on redistribution among US states in the post-WWII period and Boix (2003) and Lindert (1994) report
similar results for broader samples of countries.
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regarding modernization theoryechoes the nding by Acemoglu et al. (2008) that this
theory at least in its simplest form cannot explain why democratic institutions emerged.
We do acknowledge, however, that it is a challenge to estimate the impact of slow moving
social processes on discrete events like su¤rage reforms and that more research is needed
on this and on the related question of the link between trade integration and democracy.
We believe that western Europe during the 19th century constitutes a promising testing
ground for doing so. It would also be of interest to delve deeper into the question of social
learning and democratization.
9 Appendix A
Proof of proposition 1. Let qt be the updated threat level in period t. The rich get
yR(D)
1  if they extend the franchise. If they do not extend, then their expected income is
qt  0 + (1  qt)

yR(A)
1   (1  q)

(22)
where we have used the fact that q < bq; so that the rich given their assessment of the
baselinethreat of revolution q do not expect to extend the franchise in the future. Rear-
ranging gives equation (6). The critical value q < 1 for all q < bq. To see this, evaluate q
at bq to get
(1  ) (yR(A)  yR(D))
(1  )yR(A) + yR(D) > 0: (23)
Notice that @q
@q
=   yR(D)
(1 )yR(A) < 0 and that q for q = 0 is positive. If the rich receive reports
that induce them to update their assessment of the threat of revolution to qt  q at t  t0 ;
a transition to democracy takes place, otherwise a revolution will cause a transition to the
post-revolutionary regime.
10 Appendix B
The variables used in the analysis are dened as follows:47
1. Su¤rage is the electorate in percentage of the enfranchised age and sex group; before
the womens su¤rage, male population only (parliamentary elections). Sources: Flora
et al. (1983), Caramani (2000), and Cook and Paxton (1998).
2. TRkit is the measure of the threat of revolution. For k = u it is a simple count of
the events in a given year; for k = g the events are weighted by geographic distance;
47For notes on the construction of the data set see Aidt and Jensen (2009b).
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for k = l the events are weighted by linguistic distance, in all cases excluding events
in each country itself. The main specication includes major events (listed in Table
A1) only. For robustness, we also calculate the measures using all events including
those minor ones (listed in Table A2). Sources: Tilly (1993, 2004), Todd (1998), and
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, 2009). The source of linguistic distance is Fearon
(2003).
3. GDP per capita is real GDP at international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, adjusted
to exclude the impact of border changes, per capita. Source: Maddison (2003).
4. Population is the size of the total population in 1000s. Source: Maddison (2003).
5. Agricultural share is the number of individuals employed in agriculture, mining and
shing per 1000 employees. Source: Mitchell (2007).
6. Urbanization rate is the proportion of the population who lives in towns with more
than 20,000 inhabitants. Source: Banks (2003).
7. Education attainment is a dummy coded 1 for the years after which enrollment in
primary education as a percentage of all 5-14 year olds reached 60% and 0 otherwise.
Sources: Flora (1983) and Mitchell (2007).
8. Gold standard is a dummy equal to 1 if a country is on the gold standard in a
given year and 0 otherwise. Sources: Meissner (2004) and EH.net encyclopedia
(eh.net/encyclopedia).
9. Trade volume is exports plus imports relative to GDP. Sources: Mitchell (2007),
Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau (1999), Buyst (1997), Krantz and Schön
(2007), Grytten (2004), Flandreau and Zumer (2004); The Swiss Economic and
Social History online database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat).
10. Wheat price spread is an estimate of the trade cost between two locations in a given
period based on di¤erences in wheat prices at the two locations. Source: Jacks
(2005).
11. Social learning is dened as a distance (geographical or linguistic) weighed average
of franchise reforms in other countries. Sources: Fearon (2003) and the sources used
to dene years of franchise reform.
12. War is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is at war and 0 otherwise. Sources:
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, 2009) and Singer and Small (1994).
13. WWI is a dummy equal to 1 during World War I and 0 otherwise.
14. War intensity is the number of deaths on the battle eld per capita. Source: Singer
and Small (1994) or http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
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15. Repression is the share of total central government spending on police, defence,
general administration and the judiciary. Source: Flora et al. (1983).
16. Temporary transfers is the share of total central government spending on health, ed-
ucation, housing and various government-sponsored insurance and welfare programs.
Source: Flora et al. (1983).
<Table A1: Major revolutionary events (revolution 1 ).>
<Table A2: Minor revolutionary events (revolution 2 ).>
<Table A3: Summary Statistics for variables used in the analysis.>
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Table 1: Timing of Suffrage Reforms and Revolutionary Events in Europe, 1820-1938.  
Country Reform years Revolutionary events 
United Kingdom 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918  
Austria 1873, 1896, 1907 1848-49 
Italy 1861, 1882, 1912, 1919 1820, 1848-49 
Norway (1814), 1884, 1897  
The Netherlands 1848, 1887, 1894, 1917  
Sweden 1866, 1907, 1919  
France 1824, 1830, 1848 1830, 1848, 1870-71 
Germany 1871a 1848-49 
Finland 1869, 1906  
Belgium 1831, 1848, 1893, 1919 1830-33 
Switzerland 1848  
Denmark 1849, 1915  
Luxembourg 1841, 1848, 1857, 1868, 1893, 
1902, 1919 
 
Iceland 1874, 1908, 1916  
Spain 1836, 1865, 1869, 1888, 1890, 
1931 
1820-23, 1827, 1836, 1840, 1842, 
1843, 1854-56, 1866, 1868, 1873-
74, 1890, 1909, 1930, 1933, 1934 
Portugal 1822, 1838, 1852, 1878, 1895, 
1911 
1820, 1910, 1915, 1919, 1927  
Serbia 1869, 1889, 1920 1861 
Greece 1822, 1844 1843, 1866-68, 1935, 1938  
Romania 1866, 1923  
Poland 1921 1830-31, 1863-64 
Hungary 1867 1848-49, 1918-19 
Russia 1906 1905, 1917 
Ireland Not in the sample 1916 
Other part of Balkans Not in the sample 1826, 1885, 1888, 1907 
Sources: Carstairs (1980), Flora et al. (1983), Caramani (2000), Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, 2009), Seymour and 
Frary (1918), Todd (1998), Tilly (1993, 2004).  
Notes: In column 3 the years in bold indicate the major revolutionary events included in the construction of the three main 
measures of the threat of revolution (TRk, major events). The remaining years indicate the additional minor revolutionary 
events included in the construction of (TRg, all events) (see Appendix for details). a. Right from its unification, Germany 
had full male suffrage, and the Weimar Republic of 1920 is therefore not regarded as a reform year. Suffrage is, in fact, 
close to 98 percent before 1920.  
 
Table 2: Results for the Panel Model I.  
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
TRu (unweighted, major events) 1.89***    2.02***  1.87***  
 [5.78]    [4.24]  [2.68]  
TRg (geographical, major events)  1.22***    1.38***  1.20*** 
  [6.56]    [4.92]  [3.02] 
TRl (linguistic, major events)   12.00**      
   [1.96]      
TRg (geographical, all events)    0.82***     
    [4.80]     
Suffrage (lagged) 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 
 [69.94] [73.89] [66.78] [70.83] [35.53] [35.57] [51.54] [51.00] 
Log GDP per capita (lagged) -0.64 -1.66 -0.38 -0.81 3.75 3.31 -1.43 -1.58 
 [-0.25] [-0.72] [-0.16] [-0.32] [0.98] [0.87] [-0.35] [-0.41] 
Log Population (lagged) 4.79* 5.11** 5.66** 4.42* -0.35 -0.36 2.67 2.14
 [1.95] [2.08] [2.26] [1.80] [-0.56] [-0.58] [0.40] [0.38] 
Urbanization rate (lagged) 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0,003 -0,002 
 [0.20] [-0.50] [0.26] [0.21] [0.16] [0.20] [-0.22] [-0.13] 
War 4.20*** 3.62*** 3.50*** 4.14*** 3.83** 3.83** 3.54** 3.50** 
 [3.97] [3.55] [3.43] [3.92] [2.44] [2.44] [2.26] [2.38] 
WWI -2.21 -2.26 -2.44 -2.10 -2.66 -2.60 -2.10 -2.03 
 [-1.15] [-1.10] [-1.17] [-1.11] [-0.96] [-0.94] [-0.51] [-0.52] 
Educational attainment (lagged) 0.069 -0.099 -0.29 0.12 2.00 2.05 -0.22 -0.34 
 [0.09] [-0.14] [-0.40] [0.15] [1.22] [1.26] [-0.15] [-0.24] 
Gold standard -0.49 -0.19 0.40 -0.56 -0.48 -0.44 -0.04 -0.004 
 [-0.60] [-0.23] [0.51] [-0.68] [-0.36] [-0.33] [-0.03] [-0.003] 
Social learning (geographic) -76.7 -105.5  -64.7 -122.0 -129.8* -73.8 -51.6 
 [-1.07] [-1.53]  [-0.92] [-1.58] [-1.69] [-0.52] [-0.39] 
Social learning (linguistic)   -2.65*      
   [-1.77]      
Observations 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Estimation technique Fixed  Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
GMM- 
System 
GMM-
System 
Bruno 
LSDV 
bias 
corrected 
estimator 
Bruno 
LSDV 
bias 
corrected 
estimator 
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations 
include two-year average time fixed effects. 
Table 3: Results for the Panel Model II.  
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
 (1)b (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TRg (geographical, major events) 0.99*** 1.97*** 1.33***  1.27*** 1.23*** 
 [5.33] [4.65] [6.43]  [5.03] [6.65] 
TRg (geographical, major events, lagged)    0.99**   
    [2.38]   
Trend -1.13      
 [-0.45]      
Cycle 2.89   
 [0.42]     
Repression  -0.049     
  [-1.14]     
Temporary transfers   -0.016    
   [-0.35]    
Observations 1057 618 875 1069 1069 1069 
Number of countries 12 9 a 9 a 12 12 12 
Estimation technique Fixed  Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects Tobit Clustering 
Notes: Robust z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations 
include two-year average time fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 2. a. Data from Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland are missing; b. Log GDP per capita is replaced by cycle and trend. 
 
Table 4: Results from the Event History Model I. 
Estimates of the probability of a suffrage reform, 1820-1938, Western European Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
TRu (unweighted, major events) 0.74***     
 [3.94]     
TRg (geographical, major events)  0.51***   0.48*** 
  [4.21]   [5.23] 
TRl (linguistic, major events)   7.17**   
   [2.46]   
TRg (geographical, all events)    0.45***  
    [3.70]  
Log GDP per capita (lagged) 0.21 -0.09 2.42 -0.16 -0.23 
 [0.11] [-0.046] [1.28] [-0.08] [-0.11] 
Log Population (lagged) 0.94*** 1.00*** 0.85*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 
 [3.14] [3.28] [2.85] [3.06] [2.92] 
Urbanization rate (lagged) -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
 [-0.77] [-0.85] [-1.46] [-0.71] [-0.59] 
War -0.13 -0.28 0.06 -0.05 -0.20 
 [-0.14] [-0.27] [0.064] [-0.048] [-0.18] 
WWI -0.92 -0.59 -0.45 -0.37 -0.42 
 [-0.82] [-0.52] [-0.39] [-0.32] [-0.34] 
Educational attainment (lagged) 0.34 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.43 
 [0.48] [0.65] [0.72] [0.68] [0.60] 
Gold standard -0.68 -0.49 -0.60 -0.41 -0.45 
 [-1.14] [-0.80] [-1.01] [-0.67] [-0.68] 
Social learning (geography) 39.3 42.7  38.9 41.6 
 [1.26] [1.37]  [1.26] [1.25] 
Social learning (linguistic)   -0.32   
 [-0.36]  
Observations 647 647 647 647 647 
Number of countries 10 10 10 10 10 
Estimation technique Logit Logit Logit Logit Rare events 
Notes:  z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1%. Constant term not 
reported. Only ten countries are included in the event history study as Germany and Switzerland had full male suffrage 
from the time they became unified countries. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate. 
Table 5: Results from the Event History Model II. 
Estimates of the probability of a suffrage reform, 1820-1938, Western European Sample 
 (1) (2) (3)b (4) (5) (6) 
TRg (geographical, major events) 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.67*** 0.50***  
 [4.21] [7.30] [4.60] [2.69] [4.07]  
TRg (geographical, major events, 
 lagged)      0.36** 
      [2.53] 
Trend   -1.01    
   [-0.55]    
Cycle -1.22  
   [-0.17]    
Repression    -0.020   
    [-0.60]   
Temporary transfers     0.067  
     [1.32]  
Observations 647 647 633 372 602 647 
Number of countries 10 10 10 9 a 9 a 10 
Estimation technique Random effects Clustering Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Notes:  z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Only ten countries are 
included in the event history study as Germany and Switzerland had full male suffrage from the time they became unified 
countries. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate and include the same control variables as in 
Table 4. a. Data from Austria are missing. b. Log GDP per capita is replaced by cycle and trend. 
 
 
Table 6: Results from the Event History Model III. 
Estimates of the probability of a suffrage reform, 1820-1938, Broader European Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TRu (unweighted, major 
events) 0.36*** 0.37***   0.47*** 0.48***   
 [3.18] [3.29]   [3.08] [3.35]   
TRg (geographical, major 
events)   0.27*** 0.27***   0.31*** 0.32*** 
   [4.32] [4.40]   [3.51] [3.97] 
Log GDP per capita (lagged)     0.23 0.24 0.18 0.20 
      [0.53] [0.49] [0.43] [0.42] 
Log Population (lagged)     0.35* 0.35* 0.36* 0.35* 
     [1.91] [1.89] [1.95] [1.94] 
War -0.09 -0.09 -0.24 -0.13 0.30 0.37 0.18 0.26 
  [-0.15] [-0.15] [-0.40] [-0.21] [0.45] [0.55] [0.26] [0.38] 
WWI 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.60 -0.24 -0.13 -0.12 -0.0005 
 [0.73] [0.69] [0.88] [0.97] [-0.33] [-0.17] [-0.17] [-0.0006] 
Observations 1755 1755 1755 1755 1063 1063 1063 1063 
Number of countries 20a 20a 20a 20a 16b 16b  16b 16b 
Estimation technique Logit Rare events Logit 
Rare 
events Logit 
Rare 
events Logit 
Rare 
events 
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  a. The sample includes 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Rumania. b. These specifications include 
Russia, Serbia, Iceland, Luxembourg. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate. 
 
Table 7: Additional Results for the Panel Model 
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
  (1)b (2)b (3) (4)
Robustness check Add Trade volumes 
Add Wheat 
price 
spread 
Add Agricultural 
share 
Add war- 
intensity 
     
TRg (geographical, major events) 1.56*** 1.75*** 1.056*** 1.23*** 
 [7.60] [4.19] [4.26] [6.61] 
Trade volume (lagged) 0.038**    
 [2.12]    
Wheat price spread (lagged)  2.56   
  [0.48]   
Agricultural share (lagged)  -0.013
   [-1.56] 
War-intensity     5.06** 
    [2.11] 
Observations 858 405 876 1069 
Number of countries 12 7 a 12 12 
Estimation technique Fixed  Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects
Notes: See notes to Table 2. All estimations include the same control variables as in Table 2 and we only report the new 
variables.  a. Data from Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland are missing; b. Gold standard is 
replaced by the alternative measure of trade integration. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Additional Results for the Event History Model. 
Estimates of the probability of a suffrage reform, 1820-1938, Western European Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Robustness check Add trade volumes 
Add wheat price 
spread 
Add 
agricultural 
share 
Add war- 
intensity  
     
TRg (geographical, major events) 0.58*** 0.45** 0.43*** 0.53*** 
 [4.32] [2.17] [3.00] [4.58] 
Trade volume (lagged) 0.017    
 [1.26]    
Wheat price spread (lagged)  0.21  
  [0.07]   
Agricultural share (lagged)   -0.002  
   [-0.62]  
War-intensity    0.50 
    [0.21] 
Observations 529 280 471 647 
Number of countries 9a 6 b 10 10 
Estimation technique Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. All estimations include the same control variables as in Table 2 and allow for duration 
dependency.  We only report the new variables. a. Data from Belgium are lost. a. Data from Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden are missing. c. Gold standard is replaced by the alternative measure of trade integration. 
 
 
Table A1: Major Revolutionary Events. 
Events Region Year 
Revolution in Hungary 
Eastern 
Europe 1848-9 
Bloodless revolution in Hungary, ending in foreign military 
intervention 
Eastern 
Europe 1918-19 
Mutiny of Spanish troops under Colonel Rafael Riego, generalizing 
revolution to 1823, termination by French invasion Iberia 1820-23 
Revolution at Oporto, Portugal Iberia 1820 
Revolt of malcontents in Spain Iberia 1827 
Portuguese insurrection of General Pimenta de Castro, followed by 
democratic revolution Iberia 1915 
Belgian revolution vs. Holland (French, British intervention) Belgium 1830-33 
Easter Rebellion in Ireland 
British 
Isles 1916 
July Revolution 
French 
states 1830 
French Revolution 
French 
states 1848 
State collapse, occupation, republican revolutions 
French 
states 1870 
Multiple communes 
French 
states 1870-71 
Russian revolution 
Russian 
states 1905 
Russian revolution 
Russian 
states 1917 
Naples Italy 1820 
Italian States Italy 1848-49 
Habsburg Austria 1848-49 
German states Germany 1848-49 
 
 
Table A2: Minor Revolutionary Events.  
Events Region Year 
Janissary rebellion in Constantinople Balkans 1826 
Pro-constitutional uprising in Greece Balkans 1843 
Revolt in Herzegovina Balkans 1861 
Revolt in Crete Balkans 1866-68 
Insurrections in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria Balkans 1875-78 
Pro-Bulgarian revolution in Eastern Roumelia Balkans 1885 
Peasant insurrection in Romania Balkans 1888 
Peasant insurrection in Moldovia Balkans 1907 
Young Turks’ revolution in the Ottoman Empire, including 
insurrection in Macedonia Balkans 1908-09 
Albanian insurrection Balkans 1910 
Venezelist rising in Greece Balkans 1935 
Revolt in Crete Balkans 1938 
Royalist rising in Spain Iberia 1822-23 
Progressist insurrection in Andalusia, Aragon, Catalonia and 
Madrid, ending in constitution of 1837 Iberia 1836 
Revolt of General Baldomero Espartero who seized power in 
Spain Iberia 1840 
Rising in Barcelona, temporary declaration of republic, crushed 
by Espartero Iberia 1842 
Coalition deposes Espartero; Narvaez president until 1851 Iberia 1843 
Spanish revolution led by O'Donnell and Espartero Iberia 1854-56 
Failed insurrection of General Juan Primenta Iberia 1866 
Pronunciamento of Admiral Juan Topete; generalization of 
insurrection Iberia 1868 
First Spanish Republic, Carlists rising Iberia 1873-74 
Anarchist outrages in Spain Iberia 1890 
Catalan general strike, insurrection Iberia 1909 
Insurrection in Lisbon, proclamation of republic Iberia 1910 
Royalist uprising in Northern Portugal Iberia 1919 
Failed insurrection against Portuguese military regime Iberia 1927 
Mutiny of garrison at Jaca, demanding republic Iberia 1930 
Barcelona rising of anarchists and syndicalists Iberia 1933 
Working-class insurrection in Asturias, general strike and 
insurrection in Catalonia Iberia 1934 
Polish rebellion in Greater Poland 
Russian 
states 1830-31 
Polish rebellion in Greater Poland 
Russian 
states 1863-64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Summary Statistics for the Variables used in the Analysis. 
Variable #Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Suffrage 1297 47.463 38.604 0 110.1 
TRu (unweighted, major events) 1403 0.246 0.742 0 5 
TRg (geographical, major events) 1403 0.352 1.241 0 15.105 
TRl (linguistic, major events) 1403 0.0146 0.059 0 0.803 
TRg (geographical, all events) 1403 0.719 1.374 0 15.105 
Log GDP per capita 1280 7.74 0.45 6.66 8.76 
Trend GDP 1110 7.82 0.42 6.85 8.76 
Cycle GDP 1110 0.00035 0.028 -0.179 0.16 
Log Population 1413 8.85 1.21 6.79 11.10 
Urbanization rate 1278 206.09 152.54 0.00 732.00 
War 1330 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
WWI 1403 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
War intensity 1413 0.0079 0.075 0 1.00 
Social learning, geographic 1403 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 
Social learning, linguistic 1403 1.008 0.7809 0 3.242 
Gold standard 1403 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Education attainment 1237 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Trade volume 948 45.01 25.63 2.24 140.17 
Wheat price spread 529 0.46 0.17 0.22 1.13 
Agricultural share 952 404.23 157.97 52.00 821.05 
Repression 657 46.92 14.48 16.70 89.20 
Temporary transfers 1007 9.46 10.96 0 50.4 
 
